We gave 40 participants a task in which they needed to select target objects from an array according to the instructions of either an informed director (who shared their perspective of the array) or an ignorant director (whose view of the array was restricted due to barriers). Importantly, sometimes only one of the directors was visible, and on some trials when both directors were present, participants were required to switch between perspectives. We found that participants were faster to select items from the informed director's perspective than the ignorant director's perspective, but that they slowed when there was a visible but inactive second director. Crucially, relative to nonswitch trials where the same perspective was taken twice consecutively, participants exhibited a significant cost of switching between perspectives when returning to take their own perspective, but not when switching to the other point of view. We interpret these results as evidence that participants inhibit their more salient perspective in order to adopt another's, and then incur an asymmetric switch cost as a result. This suggests that although we are egocentric by default, our egocentricity is effectively, albeit temporarily, eliminated if we have just adopted an alternative frame of reference.
. In the task, a participant is instructed to select and move items on a series of shelves (a "grid") which are placed between the participant and an "ignorant" (in noncomputerized versions, typically a confederate) director. Due to a number of occlusions in the grid, the ignorant director has a restricted view of the array of objects, and hence an instruction from the ignorant director to select an object in the grid is ambiguous if the instruction describes two items-one the ignorant director can see and one he cannot. Figure 1A illustrates an example using an image from the present experiment, where the male avatar on the far side of the grid is the ignorant instructor. The image also includes an "informed" director (female avatar) who shares the participant's view of the array and hence allows for instructions to be given that do not require the participant to take an alternative perspective (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010) . The ignorant director's view therefore corresponds to the "other" perspective, and the informed director's view corresponds to the self-perspective. Depending on which director gives the instruction to select "the top clock," the target is either the clock in the second row from the top (according to the ignorant director's point of view) or the one in the top left corner (according to the informed director's view). Across both "real-life" and computerized versions of the Director Task, the typical finding is that participants make more errors and/or are slower when selecting targets from a perspective that is not their own, or when selecting a target for which there is a competitor in privileged ground (i.e., that only the participant can see). These outcomes are consistent with the view that the egocentric perspective is privileged (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Keysar et al., 2000 Keysar et al., , 2003 Legg et al., 2017; Samuel, Roehr-Brackin, & Roberson, 2016) .
But what are the limits of this apparent privilege? Is it possible to regulate egocentricity in visual perspective taking? The questions we ask in the present study are, (i) Do expectations regarding whether perspectives might need to be alternated modulate our egocentricity? and (ii) Do we achieve such modulation by flexibly inhibiting our egocentricity in real time such that we may appear less egocentric, or cease to be egocentric at all, in the immediate moments after we have been required to ignore our own point of view?
In order to test our first hypothesis, we compared performance on trials from the informed director when the ignorant instructor was visible versus when the informed director was alone. If participants are slower to take their own perspective in the presence of an ignorant director, then we will have obtained evidence that egocentricity can be modulated by expectations, specifically the expectation that the need to take the alternative viewpoint may be imminent. This is a particularly conservative means of testing our hypothesis because the participant could theoretically simply ignore the ignorant director on any given trial, as their perspective was irrelevant to the successful completion of the informed director's instruction. To make this test more conservative still, we also did not tell participants that directors would sometimes be absent. Thus, we relied on the participants' ability to perceive for themselves which directors were present or not. To ensure that participants were not simply adopting a more cautious approach when two directors were present than when there was only one, perhaps in anticipation of the need to switch, we also manipulated the presence or absence of the informed director. This would create a baseline measure of the simple interference effect of a second visible director.
To test our second hypothesis, we also gave participants grids where both directors were on-screen and both also gave instructions. Importantly, each grid incorporated multiple instructions, and hence multiple trials. On "switching grids" participants heard instructions from both directors at unpredictable times. If egocentricity can be temporarily inhibited to take a nonegocentric perspective, then we should expect participants to find it harder to switch back to informed director's (previously inhibited) perspective than to switch to the ignorant director's perspective. This is because we incur an asymmetric switch cost when returning to a more salient rather than less salient frame of reference; the former requires greater inhibition to overcome, and the subsequent lifting of this inhibition incurs a processing cost. For example, we are slower to switch back to speaking in our more salient first language after speaking in our second than vice versa (Meuter & Allport, 1999) . We are also slower to respond to a congruent trial on Stroop-and Simon-like tasks if it comes after an incongruent trial than after another congruent trial (e.g., Egner, 2007) . We hypothesized that if the egocentric perspective takes primacy, then performance should be faster on nonswitch trials from this perspective than from the "other" perspective, but on switch trials this advantage should be reduced.
Method Participants
We recruited 40 native-English-speaking participants (M age ϭ 21 years, SD ϭ 4; 8 males, 31 females, 1 undisclosed/nonbinary).
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Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics committee. All participants gave informed consent before participating.
Director Task
Each grid consisted of a 4 ϫ 4 set of shelves with nine objects, three each of identical clocks, cups, and vases (see Figure 1A -C). Participants heard three-word instructions (through headphones) all limited to the type "The [top/bottom] [clock/cup/vase]." One director (hereinafter informed director) stood on the near side of the grid and shared the participant's ("self") perspective. Another director (hereinafter ignorant director) stood on the other side of the grid ("other" perspective) and had a limited view of the objects due to three occlusions. As a result of this limited view, the participants needed to pay attention to the perspective of the director. This was indexed by the gender of the director's voice. For example, in the case of Figure 1A , the top cup, top clock, or bottom vase would describe different targets depending on whom the instruction came from. Participants responded with mouse clicks on the chosen target. Director gender was fully counterbalanced between participants (i.e., for half the participants the ignorant director was always female).
Different from other Director Tasks, grid types varied according to the number of directors who were present on screen (one or two) and the number of directors who actually gave verbal instructions for that grid. On no-switching grids, only one director gave instructions, but that director could be alone (one-director condition) or accompanied (two-director condition). When only one director was visible, the other was replaced by a lampstand in order to maintain a physical presence in that spot (see Figure 1B -C). On switching grids, both directors were visible, and crucially both gave instructions. This format resulted in "switch" trials, where the director who gave the instruction could be different from the director who spoke on the previous trial, and "nonswitch" trials, where the instruction came from the same director as the previous trial. The results of switching and nonswitching grids were analyzed separately.
A total of 216 trials were distributed over 42 grids of 4 -6 trials with a fixed 3,500-ms intertrial interval. The grids and directors for that grid were presented on screen 5,000 ms prior to the first instruction. Experimental trials concerned those occasions where the instruction would refer to a different object if the nontarget perspective was erroneously selected, and filler trials involved a target that would be the same regardless of perspective. Across the 28 no-switching grids, there were 18 each of experimental and filler trials from each director (informed and ignorant) in each of the one-director and two-director conditions, making a total of 72 nonswitch trials and 72 filler trials. Apart from the presence or absence of the second director, all the visual and audio stimuli were constant across the one-director and two-director conditions. Crucially, each director was on screen for the same length of time across the task as a whole.
There were also 36 experimental trials and a matched number of filler trials across the 14 switching grids. Half of the experimental trials were switch trials, so there were nine nonswitch trials and nine switch trials from each director. These grids were interspersed among the nonswitching grids and ensured that participants could not always maintain the perspective of the first director they heard on any given grid. To reinforce this, the practice grid that all participants performed prior to the task proper was also a switching-condition grid. Participants only moved on the task proper once they performed this grid error free. To avoid any potential order effects, we randomly generated two grid sequences and created two more by reversing the order of grids on them. Coupled with the counterbalancing of director gender, this meant that there were eight versions of the experiment, each performed by five participants. The layout of each grid array and full details of the sequencing of each version of the experiment are included in the supplemental materials (SOM1 and SOM2, respectively) found online.
Participants were told to take the perspective of the director who spoke into account when clicking on objects in the grid and were told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. They were not told that a director would be replaced on some grids by a lampshade, or that only one director would give instructions on certain grids. The task took around 20 min to complete.
Results

No-Switching Grids
Accuracy. We first analyzed those grids where only one director gave instructions, but another director may or may not have been present. By definition, all trials on these grids were nonswitch trials. A total of 34 experimental trial errors were time-outs (Ͻ1% experimental trials), and these were included as errors in the accuracy data but were removed from the response-time analyses. Responses made 800 ms or faster after trial onset (i.e., before noun onset) almost always occurred after a timeout trial, indicating that they were late responses to the previous trial, and these 28 trials (Ͻ1%) were removed entirely as a result. The remaining errors were clicks on other objects or areas of the screen. These were included in accuracy analyses as errors but excluded from response-time analyses. Mean accuracy was very high and is listed in Table 1 . The distribution of accuracy rates was not normal. Friedman's two-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) by ranks found no variation between accuracy on these four trial types (Z ϭ 0.277, p ϭ .964). Figure 1 . Examples of the visual stimuli used in the experiment. A) Two-director grid-this could be either a No-switching grid or a Switching grid, depending on whether just one director gave instructions or both did on that grid. B) One-director grid (ignorant director only). C) One-director grid (informed director only). These stimuli depict examples with the ignorant director played by a male; half of the participants received a version with the ignorant director played by the female. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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Response times. Mean response times were calculated from noun onset, which itself was calculated for each individual instruction/audio file. As the data were normally distributed in each cell (Shapiro-Wilks tests, all ps Ͼ .5), we proceeded with parametric tests.
We conducted a 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) ϫ 2 (Presence: One Director vs. Two Directors) fully within-subjects ANOVA. The condition means are displayed in Figure 2 . The analysis revealed a main effect of Presence, F(1, 39) 
Switching Grids
Accuracy. We next analyzed the data for those 12 grids where both directors were present and each gave instructions. A total of 26 (Ͻ2%) experimental trial errors were time-outs, and responses made 800 ms or faster after trial onset (i.e., before noun onset) were removed entirely (17 trials, Ͻ2%). Mean accuracy is displayed in Table 1 . Friedman's two-way ANOVAs by ranks found significant variation in accuracy among the four trial types (Z ϭ 15.732, p ϭ .001), but follow-up pairwise comparisons applying the Bonferroni correction found no differences to be significant (adjusted ps Ͼ .09).
Response times. As the data were normally distributed in each cell (Shapiro-Wilks tests, all ps Ͼ .3), we proceeded with parametric tests.
We conducted a 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) ϫ 2 (Switch: Non-Switch vs. Switch) fully within-subjects ANOVA. The condition means are displayed in Figure 3 . The analysis revealed main effects of Perspective, F(1, 39) 
Discussion
We explored whether (i) participants' egocentricity would be modulated by the mere presence of an ignorant director and (ii) whether participants showed evidence of inhibiting their own perspective in order to take another's. The results pointed to four main findings. First, participants were faster overall on trials from the self-perspective than the other-perspective. Second, participants were slower when switching perspectives than when holding them. The third finding concerned our first hypothesis; we found that participants were slower to respond when there were two directors on-screen than when there was only one. However, this cost was not restricted to the appearance of a redundant ignorant director but was equally present when there was a redundant informed director, ruling out an account by which participants modulated their egocentricity specifically. The fourth finding concerned our second hypothesis; we found that the advantage conferred by taking one's own egocentric perspective disappeared when switching perspectives. In other words, the primacy of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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SAMUEL, ROEHR-BRACKIN, JELBERT, AND CLAYTON egocentricity was eliminated on trials immediately following trials from the ignorant director. We discuss these four findings in turn. First, the finding that participants were faster to take the informed director's perspective than the ignorant director's when either was alone was entirely expected, fitting as it does the theory that we have an egocentric bias in visual perspective taking (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2003) . We feel that there are at least three specific reasons for why participants were faster from the informed than the ignorant director's perspective on one-director trials: i) The informed director's perspective could be easier because it omits the need to process the more complex spatial structure that occlusions create; ii) the target of an instruction from the informed director was always the best perceptual match for the description (i.e., the top vase is factually the top vase; e.g., Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003 ; see also Heller, Parisien, & Stevenson, 2016) ; and iii) the informed director's visual perspective is reinforced with the extra activation that comes from its being shared with the participants'. We do not prefer one of these potential accounts over another, and of course more than one may be involved at the same time.
Our second finding, namely that participants were slower on switch trials than nonswitch trials, was also expected. Participants do typically perform more slowly when they are required to switch between visual perspectives within blocks of trials (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2017; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010 ; though see Samuel et al., 2016) . Explanations that have been put forward for this include evidence from eye-tracking data that participants conduct a broader visual search on switch trials, or possibly experience greater interference between self and other states (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2017) .
The same processes that make switching perspectives harder likely account for the slower response times when two directors are on screen than when only one is. Interestingly, we found that the size of this effect was similar regardless of whether it was the ignorant or the informed director that was visible but inactive on that grid. The present study therefore establishes that this interference effect occurs not only in the presence of a director who takes a different view from the participant's, but even extends to a director who shares the participant's egocentric perspective. Given that the informed director was in effect carrying a "redundant" perspective because it was the participant's own in any case, this result points strongly to an account by which the presence of a second director resulted in the expectation that a more taxing switch trial may be imminent. This creates a rather unusual "egocentric" interference effect caused not by one's own knowledge, but by an avatar who shares it. This has important ramifications for perspective-taking research that uses proxies such as avatars to represent self-perspective trials in a task; it appears that it cannot be taken for granted that just because an avatar and participant share a perspective, the participant will perform the same with or without the proxy.
Our most interesting finding was that the advantage of the self-perspective on nonswitch trials disappeared on switch trials. This was driven by a statistically significant slowdown on switch trials to the informed director. Switching to the ignorant director did not cause any such slowdown. This pattern of results appears to be consistent with the suggestion that the egocentric perspective was the more salient by default, and hence required a disproportionate degree of inhibition relative to the other perspective, a finding that is in turn consistent with the evidence from other tasks that report so-called asymmetrical switch costs that we described earlier (e.g., Egner, 2007; Meuter & Allport, 1999; see Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010 , for a discussion of potential mechanisms underpinning asymmetric switch costs). It is also consistent with the broader view that domain-general, top-down processes can modulate our ability to take nonegocentric perspectives (e.g., Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Cane et al., 2017; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010) . For example, Lin et al. (2010) found that participants with greater working memory resources needed less time between first fixating and then selecting targets in a Director Task, and Cane et al. found that rewarding participants led them to make greater use of perspective information (i.e., what was in privileged or common ground). In the original computerized version of the Director Task, Apperly and colleagues (2010) also suggested that general executive processes were implicated in the ability to successfully take the ignorant director's perspective. However, studies also exist that suggest top-down processes do not influence our ability to take perspective (e.g., Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Ryskin, Brown-Schmidt, Canseco-Gonzalez, Yiu, & Nguyen, 2014) . It may be that more local, task-based factors influence any relationship, such as whether we take the perspective of a person or an avatar (see, e.g., Skarratt, Cole, & Kuhn, 2012) . Our finding also seems to contradict that of Bradford, Jentzsch, and Gomez (2015) , who reported an asymmetric switch cost favoring more efficient switches to the self-perspective. This inconsistency might be explained by differences in task aims and design. For example, in Bradford and colleagues' study the other person was introduced suddenly at the moment of the switch and not before, which may have increased processing demands relative to switches to the other perspective in our study, and relative to switches to a self-perspective (which is instead present throughout by default). Perhaps more important, our study was concerned with testing visual perspective taking, whereas Bradford et al. were investigating belief attributions. It may be that different processes are engaged in switching between visual perspectives and switching between belief states.
Overall, however, we feel that the results of this study appear not to offer unqualified support to one theory of perspective taking or another. On the one hand, the results appear to favor the view that the egocentric perspective is the most salient by default, first because trials from this perspective were performed more quickly, and second because we do not see a switch cost on trials from the ignorant director. However, it is also clear that this egocentricity is flexible; it can be temporarily eliminated by the mere act of taking the "other" frame of reference as our starting point and then having to adjust back to our own. In this sense, our results might also be viewed as supporting accounts that posit a less pivotal role of egocentrism in such tasks (e.g., Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011) . Important questions for future research thus concern at what point the balance of perspective salience might tip in favor of another's viewpoint for a more sustained period; how many times do we need to take another person's perspective before we are required instead to suppress that perspective? How quickly might such a reversal of salience take to decay? And given the fluid and efficient perspective taking in linguistic interaction (Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011) , is egocentricity more flexible in language-based tasks?
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FLEXIBLE EGOCENTRICITY
In summary, we found that although we are believed to be inherently egocentric, taking an alternative point of view is enough to temporarily suspend the salience of our own perspective. As such, the primacy of our egocentricity may be more flexible, or fragile, than we think.
